SecureCore
Efficient Randomness Generation Techniques for Embedded Systems
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Princeton University Department of Electrical Engineering Technical Report CE-L2007-015 (2007)A Secure yet High Performance Cache Architecture
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Princeton University Department of Electrical Engineering Technical Report CE-L2007-012 (2007)Memory Integrity for Secure Computing Platforms
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Princeton University Department of Electrical Engineering Technical Report CE-L2007-003 (2007)SP Processor Architecture Reference Manual
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Princeton University Department of Electrical Engineering Technical Report CE-L2007-009 (2007)Notes:
Version 0.7TEC-Tree: A Low Cost and Parallelizable Tree for Efficient Defense against Memory Replay Attacks
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Princeton University Department of Electrical Engineering Technical Report CE-L2007-002 (2007)Secure Key Management Architecture Against Sensor-node Fabrication Attacks
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IEEE GlobeCom 2007, Washington, DC (2007)Abstract:
Abstract—In lightweight mobile ad hoc networks, both probabilistic and deterministic key management schemes are fragile to node fabrication attacks. Our simulation results show that the Successful Attack Probability (SAP) can be as high as 42.6% with the fabrication of only 6 copies from captured nodes comprising only 3% of all nodes. In this paper, we propose two low-cost secure-architecture-based techniques to improve the security against such node fabrication attacks. Our new architectures, speci?cally targeted at the sensor-node platform, protect long-term keys using a root of trust embedded in the hardware System-on-a-Chip (SoC). This prevents an adversary from extracting these protected long-term keys from a captured node to fabricate new nodes. The extensive simulation results show that the proposed architecture can signi?cantly decrease the SAP and increase the security level of key management for mobile ad hoc networks.Re-examining Probabilistic Versus Deterministic Key Management
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Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Nice, France, p.2586-2590 (2007)Abstract:
It is widely believed that although being more complex, a probabilistic key predistribution scheme is much more resilient against node capture than a deterministic one in lightweight wireless ad hoc networks. Backed up by the surprisingly large successful attack probabilities computed in this paper, we show that the probabilistic approaches have only limited performance advantages over deterministic approaches. We first consider a static network scenario as originally considered in the seminal paper by Eschenauer and Gligor [1], where any node capture happens after the establishment of all pairwise links, and show that the deterministic approach can achieve a performance as good as the probabilistic one. Furthermore in a mobile network, the probabilistic key management as described in [1] can lead to a successful attack probability of one order of magnitude larger than the one in a static network.New computer architecture aids emergency response
Wed, 11/07/2007 - 15:07 — PALMSPrinceton University Top Stories — by Teresa Riordan · Posted October 31, 2007; 10:21 a.m.
Princeton researchers have invented a computer architecture that enables the secure transmission of crucial rescue information to first responders during events such as natural disasters, fires or terrorist attacks.
New Cache Designs for Thwarting Software Cache-based Side Channel Attacks
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Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA 2007), San Diego, CA, p.494 - 505 (2007)Abstract:
Software cache-based side channel attacks are a serious new class of threats for computers. Unlike physical side channel attacks that mostly target embedded cryptographic devices, cache-based side channel attacks can also undermine general purpose systems. The attacks are easy to perform, effective on most platforms, and do not require special instruments or excessive computation power. In recently demonstrated attacks on software implementations of ciphers like AES and RSA, the full key can be recovered by an unprivileged user program performing simple timing measurements based on cache misses.We first analyze these attacks, identifying cache interference as the root cause of these attacks. We identify two basic mitigation approaches: the partition-based approach eliminates cache interference whereas the randomization-based approach randomizes cache interference so that zero information can be inferred. We present new security-aware cache designs, the Partition-Locked cache (PLcache) and Random Permutation cache (RPcache), analyze and prove their security, and evaluate their performance. Our results show that our new cache designs with built-in security can defend against cache-based side channel attacks in general – rather than only specific attacks on a given cryptographic algorithm – with very little performance degradation and hardware cost.
